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1TAKING CRIME VICTIMS SERIOUSLY
C Goredema1
ZIM LAW REV 1989-90
Introduction
Victims of crime, like the offences themselves, exist in various categories. They all share 
one common characteristic:that they have suffered damage, either in their physical well being or 
in their financial status on account of the criminal conduct of other people.
Our system of criminal procedure provides an apparently quick method of assisting a 
specific type of crime victim soon after the conviction of the perpetrator of the crime. Section 
341 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chapter 59 provides for the making of an award 
of compensation in favour of the victim of a crime by a court of first instance. The relevant part 
reads:
"341 (1) When any person is convicted by a court with jurisdiction in civil cases or the court
of a regional magistrate of an offence which has caused damage to or loss of property 
belonging to some other person, the court trying the case may, after recording the 
conviction and upon the application of the injured party or of the person conducting 
the prosecution acting on the instructions of such party, forthwith award him 
compensation for such damage or loss:
Provided that no such award shall be made by any court if the compensation 
claimed exceeds one thousand dollars."
Other subsections of that section set out the guidelines to assist the court in determining 
whether an offence has caused damage to property and the quantum of the award. It is also 
provided that an award by the trial court in terms of section 341 can be registered with the clerk 
of the civil court so as to render it enforceable as a civil judgment.
In principle therefore, the High Court, all magistrates courts and community courts2 can 
make enforceable awards in favour of victims of crime. It would appear then, that sufficient 
attention is paid to the victims of crime in criminal proceedings. Need they be accorded any 
more?
My purpose in this paper is to show that the compensatory scheme envisaged in the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chapter 59 is inadequate and in need of revision. Even as 
it stands, S. 341 excludes so many potential applicants for compensation that the few it provides 
for are in fact the residue rather than the main body of the general class of persons prejudiced 
by offences. S. 341 caters for the exceptional cases.
Context
Perhaps a little needs to be said about the context in which the question of compensation 
for crime victims arises. One can safely assume that in the majority of crimes which our counts 
are called upon to try some person or persons will have suffered harm on account of the 
commission of the crime. The victims could be:
(i) direct victims of crime, such as persons whose property has been stolen;
(ii) dependants of those who died as a result of crime,
(iii) persons injured while taking action to prevent the commission of a crime or to apprehend the
Lecturer, Procedural Law, University of Zimbabwe
Community courts can exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of minor offences, see section 14 of 
the Customary Law and" primary courts Act, No. 6 of 1981. In practice, the writer has not come 
across any such court which does, presumably on account of a shortage of trained staff to prosecute.
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Icriminal, or while a ttem pting to  take such action;
(iv) the dependants of those mortally injured as result a of taking such action or 
a ttem pting to  take such action.
It is well known that society, through the agency of the State, devotes a great deal of 
money, attention and time to the prevention and investigation of crime and, if they are 
apprehended, the trial and punishment of offenders. The philosophy which apparently underlies 
the allocation of a significant fraction of the national budget to combating and containing crime 
is that crime is a societal ailment which must be continuously monitored and cured from time to 
time by doses of, inter alia. State - supported punishment.
My central contention here is that our system of Criminal Procedure does not pay as much 
attention to the victims of crime as it does to the perpetrators of it. The argument is that we do 
not take the victims of crime seriously enough. The legislative attempts to do this have to this 
day, been only half - hearted and of limited effect. There is a need to address the plight of crime 
victims afresh not only for the good of society, but perhaps as a way of performing an obligation 
which has long begged for attention.
Existing provisions for victim compensation in Zimbabwe.
A .Sec. 341 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chapter 59
Section 341(1) is the main provision which allows a compensatory order, sounding in 
money, to be made to a victim of a crime. Its provisions have been cited above3 In order to 
appreciate the point being made that the provision needs review, one needs to analyse section 341 
critically.
(a) Nature of the compensation order:
Unlike similar legislative provisions in Singapore- and England- , section 341 does not 
indicate whether a compensation order is to be made in addition to a sentence or as a form of 
sentence in itself. Subsection 1 simply enables the court to make a compensatory award "after 
recording the conviction." It makes no mention of the relationship between the order and 
sentence. Guidance as to the nature of this relationship therefore has to be sought from the 
practice of the courts in applying the subsection.
The courts have, over the years, assumed that a compensation order as provided for in section 
341 ( l )  is ancillary to the imposition of sentence. It appears there has been no reported case in 
which the point has been taken and expressly decided. Even in the useful case of S v Tami <ft 
Others 1983 ZLR 246 McNally J, as he then was, did not expound the conceptual relationship, 
perhaps because the point did not arise.
The position then appears to be that, by reading words into section 341( l ), the courts have 
ruled that a trial court may not regard a compensation order as a form of sentence rendering it 
unnecessary to impose any further punishment on the offender6
The courts would probably hold that that view is sound given the option available to a 
court to suspend a portion of a prison sentence on condition that restitution is made to the victim. 
I have no doubt that in practice, even though a compensatory order is ancillary to sentence, it is *8
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Page 1 supra
8. 400(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Singapore 
8.67 (1) of the English Criminal Justice Act, 1982
It was held, in R v Mkise. 1961 (2) S.A. 769 that an application for statutory compensation could be 
made after sentence has been passed. This includes cases where the accused has been cautioned and 
discharged. See. R v Hope 19S2 (3) SA . 852, S v Chiwedsa 1983 ZLR 84. It was stated, in A.G. y 
Goto A.D. 78/81 that the compensatory order was not intended to be a form of punishment.
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taken into account in the court’s assessment of sentence.
(b) Who raises the issue of compensation:
The court is not empowered in terms of section 341(1) to consider the issue of 
compensation on its own initiative. The injured party must apply for an award, either personaly 
or through the prosecutor.7 The prosecutor may not, acting on his own initiative, apply for 
compensation to be awarded to a complainant. The assumption is that the injured party is aware 
of his rights in terms of section 341. It is an assumption which is not well-founded.8 8* It would 
be preferable if the law allowed the court to make an award mero motu with the complainant’s 
consent, or the prosecutor to recommend the award of compensation where in his/her view it 
serves the ends of justice. At least the assumption that a prosecutor knows of the existence of the 
provision for compensation has stronger foundation.
(c) Compensation is dependent on conviction:
The statutory provision demands that compensation be made by the offender and not by 
the State. The making of an award must be preceeded by the conviction of the offender. 
Numerous reasons, all of them obvious, make this requirement of conviction work unfavourably 
against the victim. Some of them have been expressed in the following terms:
Firstly, many offenders escape conviction either by avoiding apprehension altogether or by securing an 
acquittal of the charge against them. Secondly, there may be conduct which is criminal in nature but 
is considered by the law to be non-criminal conduct. Thus, infants, the insane and persons acting under 
necessity, mistake or self-defence are all excused from what would otherwise have been regarded as 
criminal conduct. Such persons cannot be convicted and are not regarded technically as offenders. Does 
the premise th a t there is no convicted offender necessitate the conclusion tha t there is no crime, less still 
th a t there is no victim? Hence, it may be said th a t the requirem ent in our code for conviction as a 
prerequisite to compensation is irrelevant to the needs of the victims.®
To that list can be added a factor which is all too common in our jurisdiction, the delay 
involved in bringing an alleged offender to book. In some instances that delay may last two years. 
Those are two years during which a victim is deprived of the use of an item which he lost on 
account of a crime.
Again, linking a compensation award to a conviction leaves a victim at the mercy of 
factors over which he has no control. Conviction too often depends on the competence of the 
investigating officers, the prosecution and the bench. A well-investigated case can be lost through 
the ineptitude of the prosecution, or the incompetence of the bench. Sometimes no appeal can 
remedy the situation.10
(d) Recipients of Compensation:
Section 341 enables the court to order compensation in favour of victims of only a limited 
range of crimes, that is crimes against property. It is not competent for a court to order 
compensation in favour of a victim of a crime against the person or against character. The point 
is illustrated crisply in 5  v Paraffin.11 In that case, a young woman had been convicted of
'  S v dc Wet 1979 (2) S.A. 1183 (R.AD)
8 A survey in three major magistrates courts centres showed that over a period of six months, only 
12% of complainants who could have used section 341 f l l  relied on it.
* See Meng Heong; f19841 26 Malaya Law Rev, p. 219-237
10 For instance, where a court discharges an accused at the dose of the State case in terms of section 
188 (3l of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Chanter 59. Indeed, some magistrates have 
been known to play safe "by acquitting a defended accused at that stage to avoid criticism if the 
matter is taken on appeal. It is not clear at this stage what effect the amendment to 188 ( l l  will 
have on such an attitude.
11 HH-304-84
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assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and malicious injury to property. She had, during 
the course of what the reviewing judge described as a vicious assault, bitten off part of the 
complainant’s ear and destroyed some of the complainant’s clothes. The trial magistrate had made 
a compensation order in the sum of $600 in respect of the pain and suffering occasioned by the 
ear bite and $350 in respect of the clothes. On review, the compensation awards were set aside. 
In respect of the torn ear, the judge held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to make an award 
for pain and suffering in terms of section 341. The award in respect of the clothes collapsed 
because the claim had not been clearly quantified. It was not clear how the sum of $350 had been 
arrived at, by the claimant and the court alike. There was no doubt as to the competence of the 
order in that respect, however.
The Act does not provide for the compensation of the dependants of those who die as a 
result of crime. Secondary victims of crime are thereby excluded from recovering even funeral 
expenses incurred. A parent or guardian cannot rely on section 341 to recover medical expenses 
incurred on behalf of an injured minor. More crime victims are excluded by the Act than are 
included, partly by reason of the limited ambit of sections 341(1) and 342.
(e) Level of compensation:
Section 341 was introduced into the law as section 316 of Act 19 of 1926. The maximum 
which could be awarded then was £200 by the High Court and £50 by the lower courts. The limit 
for the lower courts was raised to £200 in I96012 and subsequently the limit for all courts was 
set at $1 000 by Act 37 of 1975.
It requires little imagination to see that the quantum of compensation allowed by section 
341 is unrealistically low. With the annual rate of inflation in double figures and the continuous 
upward pressure on prices, an award of up to $1 000 rarely adequately compensates a claimant. 
This is even more so if it is considered that the award is supposed to include consequential loss 
e.g. expenses incurred in searching for a stolen motor car.
It has been contended that in:
GOREDEMA: CRIME VICTIMS
Such summary proceedings it would be dangerous to  allow m ajor sums of money to  be disposed of. There are 
obvious weaknesses in the procedure-com plainants in theft cases, for instance, have been known to overstate the 
am ount stolen, or the value of the goods stolen. These weaknesses may be outweighed by the advantage of speed 
and convenience, b u t as the am ount involved increases, so the balance shifts away from summary awards and in 
favour of proper trial proceedings.*^
Related to the issue of quantum is that of recovery of the award. Section 341(7) and (8) 
allows an award to be registered with the clerk of the civil court, and thus become enforceable 
as a civil judgment. Like the initial application, the registration of the award has to be initiated 
by the victim. The assumption that the party in whose favour an award is made knows his way 
thereafter, which may not be well founded, again rears its ugly head. It is doubtful that the 
victim gets an explanation of the means of enforcing a civil judgment and the invariable costs 
involved after a successful application for compensation.
(f )  Appeals against compensation orders:
A compensation order in terms of section 342 is appealable in the same way as any other 
order made in criminal proceedings. Indeed, section 345(1) of the Act is premised on the 
assumption that an order may be successfully appealed against. The provision for security de 
restituendo implies that a notice of appeal against an order will not automatically operate as a stay
12 By section 39 of Act 10 of 1966. The author is indebted to McNally J, for his exposition of the 
history of the provision in S v Chiwedaa. supra, at 86 D-F.
12 S v Chiwedsa. supra.
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of execution of the order.
(g) Compensation orders and civil liability:
This is one aspect of section 341 which operates unfavourably against the victim of a 
crime. If his claim exceeds $1 000 in respect of a single offence,14 the victim must make a 
difficult decision. He either abandons any excess so that the court can hear the claim or he 
persists in his enlarged claim and gets it thrown out for lack of jurisdiction, in which case he is 
left to his civil remedies. Section 341(11) renders it impossible for the victim to temporarily 
abandon part of his claim for pursuing in the civil courts. Whether or not the award corresponds 
with the extent of the loss, the quantum stipulated in the award extinguishes the offender’s 
liability for his misdeeds. It is a most precarious right for the victim indeed!
The Act is silent on what should happen to property in respect of which a compensation 
order was made which is subsequently recovered. In insurance, the practice is for the insurer to 
take possession of such recovered property and dispose of it to best advantage. There is, 
unfortunately, no equivalent of an insurer in the situation envisaged by section 341.
B. Compensation in wildlife conservation cases:
There is a system of compensation which is limited to wildlife conservation cases. It 
provides for the award of compensation to the owner of the land on which animals are trapped 
or killed in an illegal hunt. The relevant legislation is the Trapping of Animals (Control) Act 
[Chapter 134] and the Parks and Wild Life Act 14 of 1975.
In respect of both Acts, awards of compensation must be made following a conviction. 
The complainant need not apply for an order, and the court has no discretion to consider the 
merits of the award. The odd situation which arises in some cases is that the court cannot identify 
the victim of the offence and it has to order the prosecutor to investigate the identity of the 
compaintant in order to make a competent order.
Cynics will probably find the distinction in the comparative treatment of game-keepers 
and guardians of injured wards more than odd. This is, however, not the place to engage in a 
fuller debate on the merits and demerits of that legal absurdity. Suffice to state that my concern 
in this paper is not with the Wildlife Conservation Legislation.
Another way which the courts use to effect the payment of compensation to complainants 
in criminal cases is to order the suspension of a portion of a prison sentence on condition the 
offender pays restitution to his victim.15 The obvious limitation of this mode of compensating 
crime victims is that only victims of crimes against property are covered. Even then, only the 
first category of crime victim is catered for i.e. the direct victim, such as the person from whom 
property has been stolen. The second, third and fourth categories are not provided for. 
Compensation orders made in this way have, in the main, benefited affluent persons and 
organizations, such as banks and other large employers. Victims of that nature can afford to 
insure themselves against theft by employees. I do not propose to include them as victims in a 
State-supported compensation scheme.
Do we need an alternative victims’ compensation scheme?
It is submitted that the need for a scheme providing for the compensation of crime victims 
is established, partly by the fact that most crimes result in damage and loss to the victims and 
partly by the inherent weaknesses of the main existing scheme provided for in section 341 of the
If there are a number of offences, in respect of which the claim does not exceed $1 OOO, to be made 
(S v Chiwedsa. Supra)
1® (1984) 26 Malaya Law Review, at 222.
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Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.
Some would argue, as Mr Justice McNally hinted in S v Chiwedza, that crime victims 
should pursue their claims for damages for sums greater than $1 000 or for personal injury, or for 
loss of support, in the civil courts. An extension of the argument is that it would be asking too 
much of criminal courts to require them to engage in extra work at the end of what might be a 
long trial.
The backlog of cases in criminal courts might be lengthened if these courts are required 
to engage in resolving complex issues of damage quantification.
In my view, our courts should find greater use for assessors in cases involving claims by 
crime victims. The Magistrates Court Act, Chapter 18 provides for the appointment of assessors 
to sit with magistrates in criminal trials. It is a provision which is rarely used. It is suggested that 
use should be made of that provision to develop a body of assessors who are fairly skilful at 
assessing claims arising from criminal cases. Lay jurors determine the quantum of claims in many 
common law jurisdictions. It is even more relevant to note that lay personnel participate in the 
deliberations of the Crime Victims’ Compensation tribunals of New Zealand. At the end of a trial, 
a magistrate would sum up the findings of fact which relate to the issue of liability and quantum 
of compensation for the assessors, who then decide on the final figure, with the concurrence of 
the magistrate.
It is a well known fact that although civil remedies are usually available to a crime victim, 
these remedies are not very effective since "the victim often cannot afford the expense in terms 
of money and time, of bringing a (delictual) action against the offender." Even small claims end 
up involving lawyers because of the complexity of our civil litigation system.
Modification or replacement: the dilemma
The question which arises for discussion in the light of the above is whether the 
mechanism embodied in section 341 must be retained with modifications or be completely 
replaced.
In my view, section 341 needs to be replaced. While we should retain the essential concept 
of competence on the part of a criminal court to make an order of compensation, the other 
limiting features of that provision should be discarded. I proceed to outline what a proposed new 
compensatory scheme should look like by reference to the features of the existing one.
(a) Nature of the order:
In some jurisdictions,
"victim compensation is seen as a sanction and, particularly, as an alternative means of dealing with offenders 
ra ther th an  sending them  to  prison. The offender is provided with an opportunity  to enhance his self-respect by 
allowing him to  express his guilt and sense of atonem ent through the completion of specific requirement 
benefitting the victim  of his crime. An order to  pay compensation is therefore regarded as a  less severe and more 
hum ane sanction for the offender.”
It is submitted that such a philosophy should guide our attitude to the nature of 
compensation orders. It is the philosophy which has traditionally been at the core of awards of 
compensation at customary law,16 and it has much to commend it. In every case where the 
offender is able to compensate his victim, the courts should make and enforce a compensatory 
order. This in turn implies that the court must, mero motu, be able to make an award of 
compensation in favour of a crime victim.
See Keresia and Jack v Muirweni 1958 S.R.& N 551.
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I suggest that the present, unsatisfactory lacuna in section 341 should be filled by 
borrowing from the English Criminal Justice Act. 1982.
Section 67 (the relevant provisions thereof) is in the following terms:
(la.) Compensation under subsection (l)  above shall be of such amount as the court considers appropriate, 
having regard to any evidence and to any representations that are made by or one behalf of the accused or the 
prosecutor.
and subsection (4A) where the court considers-
(a) that it would be appropriate both to impose a fine and to make a compensation order, but
(b) that the offender has insufficient means to pay both an appropriate fine and appropriate compensation, 
the court shall give preferences to compensation (though it may impose a fine as well)."
The law should lay down explicitly that a compensatory order may be made in addition 
to any other sentence the court may impose. The court should however, be required to accord a 
compensation order priority over any other sentence.
(b) Linking compensation with conviction:
Even though this linkage operates adversely against a claimant for compensation, it seems 
the most practicable in a system where compensation seeks to rehabilitate the offender and where 
there is no alternative source of funds to compensate the victim.
I would suggest that the main compensatory regime retain this requirement, partly to give 
effect to that principle of sentencing. Sooner or later, however, an application for compensation 
is bound to come up against an impecunious offender, or an offender who can only meet the claim 
in part. How is the claim, or balance of it to be paid?
The only way around this problem would be to create a separate compensatory system 
alongside that in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. This should be done through an Act 
of Parliament, as is the case with war victims compensation and the proposed social security 
scheme. That Act would establish a fund for the purpose of meeting claims by crime victims, not 
only where the offender cannot pay but also where he cannot pay in full. It would also, and more 
radically, provide for the payment of claims where no offender is convicted or where the law 
absolves the offender on account of youth or mental incapacity.
A guide as to the mechanics of such a piece of legislation can be found in New Zealand’s 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. 1963, which is more extensive than the proposed Act would 
be.
No longer would the fate of a claimant’s entitlement to damages depend solely on the 
competence of the prosecution or the court.
One is aware that in a country where social welfare legislation is non-existent, partly on 
account of the size of the national revenue base, the suggestion that the State should fund victims 
of crimes which are committed by private persons is likely to be looked upon with ridicule.
Such an attitude probably reflects an egocentricity which the material conditions of 
Zimbabwe have done much to entrench. There is an obvious need to convince the nation that 
crime is a national responsibility.17 If we start sharing that responsibility by indemnifying
It is argued that society should take full responsibility whenever a crime is committed. The 
argument may be summed up, this:
(i) the fact that a crime is committed proves that the State has failed in its elementary duty
to protect the population and the physical integrity of its members. Consequently, the
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victims of crime, albeit partially, we may have taken a significant steps in reducing crime.
(c) Recipients of compensation:
It is my view that all classes of victims of criminal conduct should have locus stand to 
apply for compensation. The various categories of victims have been listed above.18 The 
present limitations, in section 341, to direct victims is unsatisfactory.
Victims should be entitled to claim compensation even for pain and suffering. In brief 
the heads of claim which are allowed at present in civil courts should extend to criminal cases. 
There is no rational basis for making the existing distinction.
The conduct of a victim must be taken into account in determining, firstly, the liability 
of the offender and secondly, the quantum of the award.
d. Level of Compensation:
As has already been indicated above, the current level of compensation allowable by 
section 341 in too low to be meaningful. It obviously needs to be increased so as to render awards 
really compensatory. The question is whether the new scheme should retain an upper limit or 
allow trial courts to make awards which are not restricted. In deciding that issue, one must take 
account of the fact that the compensatory scheme is being proposed to complement the remedies 
available in civil law. There is no need to link the quantum of compensation which may be 
awarded by a particular court to its civil jurisdiction. It appears that even now, the upper limit 
of awards does not correspond to the limits of civil jurisdiction. The High Court, which enjoys 
unlimited civil jurisdiction, may not make an award in excess of $1 000.
If the award is to be linked to the court’s civil jurisdiction, a magistrate’s court would be 
able to award up to $5 000 in compensation, which may be inadequate in some circumstances.
In view of the fact that a crime victim must elect either to seek compensation in the 
criminal courts or one for damages in a civil court, I would submit that there should not be an 
upper limit to the size of an award which a criminal court can make.
Financing the scheme:
I must admit from the onset that my knowledge of accounting is elementary, and I am 
certainly not qualified to make an evaluation of the mode of financing the State funded scheme. 
My suggestions in that regards, can only be of a general nature. I submit though, that they are 
worth detailed exploration.
Firstly, the State would need to isolate funds generated by the payment of fines in criminal 
cases. From these funds a certain percentage, say 25% would be channelled into a Crime Victims 
Compensation Fund.
State roust bear the coat of victimisation.
(ii) Crime arises in society as a consequence of the conditions pertaining in that 
society. Rapid urbanisation, poverty, slums, overcrowded housing and poor 
living conditions, wide gape between population groups accompanied by 
antagonism between the various classes all combine to give birth to, and nourish 
crime.
(iii) Society is to blame, since "it imposes on its members, on the one hand, conditions which 
drive them into crime, and on the other hand, it exposes its members to a life holding 
danger for all, including the possibility of criminal victimisation.”
(iv) By imposing a prison sentence or a fine on a convicted offender, the State makes it 
difficulty for the injured person to receive compensation from the offender. The State 
must therefor bear responsibility for the side-effects of its punitive sanction.
18 Page J
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Secondly, offenders incarcented should be engaged on income generating work, such as 
panel-beating and repair of motor-vehicles, agricultural production, manufacturing etc. A part 
of their earnings should be transferred to the Fund, partly in order to reimburse the Fund for its 
compensation of the victim. This does not mean sentences should bear a direct relationship to the 
quantum of compensation paid to a victim. An offender should be required to continue 
contributions to the Fund even after his release from custody where his period in prison was short. 
Making prisoners pay necessary entails making our prisons more profit - oriented.
Thirdly, the state should in cases where an offender is identified and it has compensated 
the victim, be subrogated to the rights of the victim against the offender. The state should then 
be able to proceed by way of a civil action against the offender, to reimburse itself and to prevent 
the offender from getting away with it.
Another way of raising funds for the scheme would be for the state to raise the stamp duty 
paid by insurance companies in respect of the policies they issue. Ultimately, of course, it is the 
policy holder who will pay the increased levy.
Conclusion:
The subject of crime victims’ compensation is obviously more involved that one can 
adequately show in a paper of this length. It is hoped, however, that the issues raised might 
stimulate, or add to, debate on this very important topic.
For a start, I would recommend that our Legislature reconsiders carefully section 341 of the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Chapter 59, which accords greater protection to interests 
in property than interests in personal security. The compensatory regime which it provides for 
is a most unsatisfactory one, crying out for an overhaul.
A few months after the writing of this article but before its publication, a draft Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Bill was circulated. Clause 18 of the Bill seeks to extend the courts’ 
powers to award compensation. The clause seeks to repeal Part XIX of the Criminal Procedures 
and Evidence Act and substitute it with new provisions.
Section 342 of the amended Act will enable courts to award compensation to any person 
"whose right or interest in property of any description has been lost or diminished" on account of 
an offence.
Section 343 will create, for the first time in the history of the Act, a right to claim 
compensation for personal injury caused by an offence. The amount of compensation due to the 
victim must be "readily quantifiable". Ease of quantification as a factor was probably included 
in order to allay the fears of legal practitioners who may have felt that inferior courts were not 
staffed by adequately trained and experienced judicial officers. The fact remains, however, that 
the question of whether the amount is readily quantifiable or not if left to the discretion of the 
court.
The new provisions remove the $1 000 limit for compensation awards. A court with power 
to make an award can make it in any amount. In my view, this departure from the limitations of 
s.341 is a welcome development, in the light of the criticism expressed above.
A further and progressive change to the existing compensation scheme is set out in the new 
S.345D. While the new provision retains the requirement that compensation can only be granted 
upon application, it provides, in s.s (2) that "whenever a court has convicted a person of an 
offence, the court shall ensure, where appropriate and practicable, that any injured party is 
acquainted with his right to apply for an award or order in terms of this part". (The italisization 
is mine).
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The proposed amendment represents a shift from the previous practice which assumed that 
crime victims were aware of their right to apply for compensation. It recognizes the established 
fact that a significant number of potential claimants simply do not know that a criminal court can 
grant a civil remedy.
Section 345 J reproduces S. 341 ( II)  but it is noteworthy that the objections made above 
to S. 341( 11) are weakened by the fact that S.345 J is intended to operate in a system in which 
there is no limit to the size of the award which can be made. There is therefore, no question of 
a crime victim being required to abandon part of a legitimate claim so as to sustain the claim.
The provisions of clause 18 of the draft Bill are progressive and if enacted, will bring 
about a more comprehensive and just system of crime victims’ compensation. While they do not 
address all the shortcomings highlighted in this article, the provisions are an important first step.
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